The EU, democracy and Azerbaijan

As the first anniversary of Ukraine's Orange Revolution approaches, there is talk of the conditions which led to one of the most successful peaceful protests of all time being replicated in another former Soviet state: Azerbaijan. Although rarely the focus of Western attention, this impoverished yet oil-rich country on the Caspian Sea is an example of the rocky road to democracy faced by former Soviet states.

On November 6th 2005, Azerbaijan went to the polls, yet the elections, just like in Ukraine last year, were marred by widespread fraud and corruption. Both OSCE and Council of Europe observers declared that the vote did not meet democratic standards, the latter stating that the count in 43% of the polling stations had been "bad or very bad."

Those with knowledge of Azerbaijan were not surprised by this. President Aliev, who effectively inherited his position from his father in 2003 following a hasty constitutional change, showed little respect for democratic process in the run up to the election. On three separate occasions, police violently prevented thousands of opposition activists from holding a rally in the Azeri capital Baku, beating up journalists and arresting dozens of protesters. Leaders of youth movement Yeni Fikir ("New Idea") were accused of preparing a coup d'état and arrested, along with key cabinet members. Credible allegations of the ill-treatment and torture of political prisoners abound.

My own personal interest in Azeri politics stems from two particular incidences of human rights abuses. In June this year I was called upon by Fair Trials Abroad (of which I am a patron) to help Almas Gulieva, a constituent of mine imprisoned in Baku on the trumped up charge of concealing a pistol in her luggage. A British citizen with two young children, and related to an important opposition politician, she was attempting to return to London after her uncle's funeral when her luggage was searched at Baku airport. Nothing was found in the suitcase, but after it had been taken to another room which Almas was forbidden from entering, officers claimed that they had found a pistol in her luggage. She was arrested and 12 hours later informed that she would be charged, whereupon she suffered a stroke and was taken to an intensive care unit in Baku hospital. While she was there, a statement was broadcast on state television and radio and published in state newspapers that she had confessed to the crime. After several weeks of lobbying and campaigning led by the Fair Trials Abroad team in which I participated, Almas was released and allowed to return to the UK 'on compassionate grounds'.

This incident was not without foundation. Almas' relative, Rasul Guliev, is Chairman of the opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party, a former Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament and an outspoken critic of the ruling regime. He has been living in exile in the USA since 1996, but attempted to return to Baku in October this year to stand in the election. Unfortunately he never arrived, but was detained in the Ukraine after the Azerbaijani authorities issued a warrant for his arrest and his plane was diverted. I had met him in London before he made the ill-fated trip, and assured him that I would do all I could to ensure that the EU put the utmost pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities to uphold democratic standards and the rule of law in line with the political freedom and human rights clause in the EU-Azerbaijan partnership agreement. I spoke in the European Parliament on behalf of the ALDE group in a debate prior to the election, and we passed a resolution calling on the Azerbaijani authorities to respect freedom of assembly and ensure that the elections met international standards . Our demands were not met.

However, the past few weeks have seen large scale peaceful protests in Azerbaijan, again mirroring the events of a year ago in Ukraine. Opposition leaders are reportedly pursuing a carefully planned strategy which they hope will lead to peaceful revolution, by building momentum towards a re-run of the elections with a series of peaceful protests. The first protest in the week following the fraudulent election attracted 15,000 people, the second 20,000, though short of the 50,000 the opposition thinks would be needed to put pressure on the government.

But the numbers are impressive considering the risks they run. A political strategist for the opposition Azadliq (Freedom) bloc said: "We need to be more careful than in Georgia and Ukraine because, unlike in those countries, the government of Azerbaijan is willing to use force against its people. We don't want to see our supporters beaten and lying in the hospital." And indeed, on the weekend of 26-27th November when protesters attempted to set up a permanent protest in a square in Baku, they were violently dispersed by riot police. Acting with no warning and no provocation, they used indiscriminate force with truncheons, tear gas and water cannons, with dozens injured and 29 people arrested. Opposition leader Ali Kerimli has promised further demonstrations.

That the state is not afraid to use violence against protesters is one reason which has led many international observers to argue that revolution in Azerbaijan, peaceful or otherwise, is in fact unlikely. There are other equally important reasons to take this view. The opposition Azadliq bloc has no Yuschenko-type figurehead to rally round, it is poorly funded and, perhaps most importantly, has little access to the press. Although it is beyond my expertise as an MEP to predict whether events in Azerbaijan will or will not end in revolution, I am certain of one thing: the EU has a real ability to influence the way events pan out in this state which is sitting on large oil reserves.

1999 was a pivotal year for Azerbaijan, as it marked the entry into force of a "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" (PCA) with the EU. Under this agreement, Azerbaijan has benefited significantly from EU aid amounting so far to €400 million. With EU supervision, the money has been used to fund Azerbaijan's "poverty reduction strategy," and has also been used to target public sector reform. Azerbaijan's positive relationship with the Western world has already led to a doubling of the amount of foreign direct investment in the state since 2002, and a recent IMF review concluded that its economic performance had was "commendable."

However, the EU-Azerbaijan PCA places obligations on both sides, and explicitly states that "respect for democracy, principles of international law and human rights constitute essential elements of partnership." Prior to the November 6th election, it also appeared as if real progress was being made in this area. The earliest signs for a true democratic election were promising. In March this year President Aliev granted an amnesty to 115 political prisoners, and in May he issued a decree that the vote would be fair and democratic. However, recent events have shown such efforts up as little more than attempts to give a thin veneer of legitimacy to an autocratic and corrupt regime.

The EU is famed for its "carrot" approach to spreading democracy, relying on the incentive of greater involvement with the Union to encourage states to implement much needed reform. It is highly committed to pursuing this approach with Azerbaijan, and recently took preliminary steps towards allowing Azerbaijan to participate in the European Neighborhood Policy (a vehicle for forging much closer partnerships between the EU and its neighbours. ) However, that process has been suspended over Azerbaijan's move in allowing a direct flight to unrecognized North Cyprus, another story!

However useful the EU's "soft power" has been in the past, it would be an act of the utmost hypocrisy to allow the Azerbaijani authorities to get away with the corruption and violence they have demonstrated in recent weeks and months. The EU could and should invoke the EU-Azerbaijan PCA to demand a full investigation into election fraud, an immediate end to police brutality, and respect for the right of freedom of association. It should not even consider intensifying relations until this has happened.

The EU has been shamefully slow to condemn the breaking up of peaceful protests. Azerbaijan's huge oil supplies and the recent opening (by BP chairman Lord Browne and Prince Andrew) of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline demonstrate the danger that the EU will allow itself to become irretrievably embroiled in the murky realm of oil politics. The interests of human rights and climate change converge in the need to lessen our dependence on oil! EU companies are already major beneficiaries of the Azerbaijani oil sector, and Britain is its single biggest trading partner. In 1994 a BP-led consortium signed a contract for Azerbaijani oil worth $7.4 billion , and other companies have invested heavily in its oil and gas sector.

But EU governments must realise that there can be no real stability without democracy, the rule of law and an honest economy. Acting to secure short-term oil wealth may do more harm than good. 40% of Azerbaijan's population lives below the poverty line, while a handful of super-rich live in luxury and splendour. If the wealth that Azerbaijan's nascent energy industry generates is not handled in a transparent way and used to benefit the entire country rather than a corrupt few, this situation is likely to worsen. If this is allowed to happen, then talk may turn from whether or not Azerbaijan's democratic opposition will stage a bloodless coup, to something much more sinister. We Europeans may then wish we had taken stronger action when we had the chance to do so.